Journal of Applied Science and Engineering

Published by Tamkang University Press

1.30

Impact Factor

1.60

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Tiaojuan Han, Jianfeng LuThis email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it., Hao Zhang, and Wentao Gao

CIMS Research Center, Tongji University, Shanghai 201800,China


 

Received: June 29, 2023
Accepted: October 14, 2023
Publication Date: December 13, 2023

 Copyright The Author(s). This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are cited.


Download Citation: ||https://doi.org/10.6180/jase.202409_27(9).0011  


In the "main manufacturer-multiple suppliers" supply-demand mode, the main manufacturer and suppliers of the high-end equipment manufacturing industry are often characterized by bounded rationality and incomplete information, thus bringing challenges to the multiparty game of dynamic equipment quality control. This study models the part quality incentive with an evolutionary game between the main manufacturer and suppliers and discusses the stability of each equilibrium point. Furthermore, the impacts of the main manufacturer cost subsidies and supplier effort levels on strategy evolution are analyzed. Simulation results indicate that suppliers tend to improve the part quality as cost subsidies increase and required effort levels decrease. Additionally, the main manufacturer tends to incentivize suppliers with increased cost subsidies and decreased required effort levels. The findings define the effective range of cost subsidies and effort levels while providing theoretical references for studying the game decisions of the main manufacturer and suppliers.

 


Keywords: Main manufacturer; Evolutionary game; Quality regulation; Stability analysis


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